Heading for 2001 All Over Again?

July 7, 2008 by Pelikan
Filed under: Bush Foreign Policy, Terrorism 

On Sunday 11 people, mostly police officers were killed by a suicide bomber in Islamabad, Pakistan. Today, in Kabul, Afghanistan, 41 people were killed by a car bomb outside the gates of the Indian embassy. Also on Monday, six small explosions wounded 37 in Karachi, Pakistan. Nearly seven years after 9/11 and Al Qaeda’s brand of militant Islam is stronger than ever.

The Kabul bombing is being reported as the largest such attack since U.S. and allied forces toppled the Taliban from power in 2001. That 2001 campaign showed the American intelligence community and military at its best. The problem is, the war in Iraq sucked all the oxygen out of the Afghani room for too long. The Taliban is resurgent. Along with the remnants of Al Qaeda, the Taliban reconstituted itself just across the border in Pakistan. The New York Times reported on June 30 that among other things terrorist training camps – albeit smaller – have also been rebuilt in Pakistan’s semi-autonomous tribal regions.

That article, which you can read here, also outlines several other disturbing trends in Bush administration foreign policy which seem to mirror the mistakes made by the Clinton and Bush administrations leading up to 9/11.

The New York Times documents several instances of bureaucratic infighting among the intelligence and military arms in the U.S. war on terrorism. Although the Clinton administration’s problem was with White House approval for the trigger to be pulled on Bin Laden or other terrorist targets, the problem this time seems to be more internecine. The Times’ story recounts conflict between the CIA’s own field operations in Kabul and Islamabad. At other times the Pentagon has stood in the way of Special Forces operations planned for inside the Pakistani tribal areas. After all this time and money, the U.S. government still cannot operate efficiently or make crucial decisions at the right moment as it regards the military and intelligence communities, covert operations, and the proper use of military power.

This state of affairs is not what we were promised after 9/11 or after the release of the 9/11 Commission Report in July of 2004.

The wild card in U.S. attempts to manage the threat of Islamic terrorism is the drain on resources caused by the Iraqi war. There are still not enough intelligence operatives and analysts in the stable to service effectively both the Iraqi theater and the Afghani-Pakistani theater of operations. A recent request by operatives in the latter theater for more predator drones went unanswered because they are tasked to Iraq.

We have lost ground where the real threat and capacity for terrorism – someday to be aimed once again at us – grows daily: Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the run-up to 9/11 we had it easier, there was Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to focus on. We had our shots, but didn’t take them. Today, bin Laden is almost an afterthought. Whether we get him or not, his movement, his brand, has been franchised by every two-bit Wahabbist and perverter of Islam. Al Qaeda does not need bin Laden any longer.

Our inattention to Afghanistan and Pakistan has allowed these franchises the opportunity to build their business. Watching that part of the world from afar the last couple of days, it’s apparent their product is ready for market.

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